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Abstract 
The financial crisis has put pressure on government budgets across Europe. The 
expectation is that this also has affected public transport budgets in metropolitan 
areas. This article looks at five cases of metropolitan public transport to see to what 
extent this is the case. Multi-level governance and fiscal federalism explain the rather 
surprising outcome.  
This article is aimed to be a first step into a better understanding of the effect of 
governance in public transport in a broad sense. It develops the understanding of 
how the organizational context influences those funding decisions and the related 
outcome in terms of public transport services provided and passengers transported.    
The article shows that the effect of budget pressure was varied over the five cases 
depending on governance in those cases and overall can be characterized as limited. 
Funding and supply generally kept growing, despite the pressure put on budgets by 
the financial crisis.  
1 Introduction: the financial crisis and 
metropolitan public transport  
Public transport is a strong policy instrument in the hand of local and regional 
policymakers to provide a more sustainable alternative to transport by car. It 
provides a tool that can be applied in environmental policies, urban development, 
mobility management, and social inclusion policies. It can support a great number of 
the public values (Veeneman, Van de Velde and Lutje Schipholt, 2006) related to 
these policy fields: from a healthier environment to economic development, from 
fighting global warming to local upgrading, from reducing congestion to increasing 
participation. These are the values public entities want to secure when they develop 
their public transport related policy. 
Over the course of the last decades, these various public values became key reasons 
for regional and local authorities to provide financial support in the form of subsidies 
for the provision of public transport services. As public funding has become a 
substantial part of the funding of public transport, public decision-making had a 
growing role in the sector.  
In 2008, the European economy experienced the great recession (see also Pearce, 
2012). As a result, public revenue from taxes was reduced, scrutiny on deficits 
increased and public budgets put under pressure. We expect the effect on public 
transport funding to be different under different governance and financing structures 
and arrangements; the institutional context under which influence the public 
decisions on public transport are made.   
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To evaluate the effect, the paper looks a number of governance aspects that are 
expected to have an effect on the way in which budget pressure has an effect on the 
actual funding of public transport. The paper presents these as hypotheses around 
the tax base, fragmentation of decision-making, the existence of task organizations 
and the existence of long-term commitments, generally seen in tendered concessions 
to commercial operators. The paper also looks at the effect of the changes in 
funding on the use of public transport.  
This article is a first analysis of the relation between those variables: governance and 
financing of public transport and the pressure on budgets of public transport 
following the financial crisis. We have selected five cases for a first analysis of the 
possible relations mentioned above. We want to position this article as a first step 
towards understanding the relation between governance of public transport and the 
way in which a pressure on funding is dealt with.   
2 Approach: inductive case exploration 
As a first inductive exploration this article looks at the relation between the pressure 
on public budgets, the governance of public transport and the effect on public 
transport services and usage. In that analysis we treat the governance as the system 
of decision-making with an output of budget decisions on public transport. 
Williamson (2000) focuses on a set of contracts as the key base of governance. He 
also shows how institutions, where he focuses on the legal system, conditions the 
way contracts drive decision-making. This paper focuses on these contracts in public 
transport provision. Key institutions are the way the legal system distributes tasks 
over various layers of government and structures financing of public transport.  For 
those, contracts and key institutions, this paper will use the term public transport 
governance, or governance for short.  
Our main question is:  
How do different forms of public transport governance affect 
metropolitan public transport budget, service provision and usage, given 
a level of pressure on the budget? 
In managing the financial crisis the national level of government played an important 
role in the five countries we have included in the selection. European budget 
regulation put pressure on the maximum budget  
This introduces the need to analyze the role of different levels of government in 
setting the budget and goals for metropolitan public transport (see also Eyraud and 
Moreno Badia, 2013). So, for all cases this article presents a brief overview of the 
governance, with a focus on the roles of different levels of government. We structure 
the multi-level governance forms based on the perspective of Hooghe and Marks 
(2003), which allows us to understand the key dilemmas when decision-making 
power on related issues is spread over multiple governmental layers. In addition, we 
looked at the specific role of funding, and included the perspective on fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 2005). 
To provide a first answer to that question, we carried out a set of initial case 
comparisons. We selected five cases with different governance structures. These 
case studies are found in five different countries, where national legislation sets 
different institutional conditions. In addition, we chose a regional focus, as this is the 
level of governance where design choices and funding choices for public transport in 
metropolitan areas are generally concentrated. The cases selected consisted of cities 
with 200.000 to 2.000.000 inhabitants and the administrative region responsible for 
the public transport in and around that city. We also selected cases in which the 
governance and funding of public transport were substantially different in terms of 
their multi-level governance and the sources of funding.  
All cases are subject to the same European regulation (European parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2007). We have selected cases in France, Italy, 
Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries have distinct 
national regulatory regimes and different governance of public transport on a 
regional level.  
For the cases a number of variables was key for the period from the start of the 
crisis in 2008 until 2012. The cases looked at: 
- A proxy for pressure on the budget on a national level;  
- Governance structure and decision-making distribution over different levels of 
government; 
- Funding sources for public transport; 
- Development of the subsidy for public transport following the financial crisis; 
- Development of the supply of services of public transport following the 
financial crisis; 
- Development of the use of public transport in terms of trips or kilometers 
following the financial crisis. 
It is important to understand that the last three elements of the data have the goal 
to illustrate the development per case, given the assumed budget pressure. Between 
the cases we compare the relation between that development and the governance 
and funding. This is essential; the cases show different ways to measure and 
operationalize the data types that we have selected, challenging the direct detailed 
comparability of that data between cases. However, the data illustrates the 
development in the case well, and that is how we will use that data.  
To summarize, the paper looks at budget pressure as an independent variable, 
various aspects of the governance as intermediate variables and the subsidies for, 
output by, and use of public transport as dependent variables.   
This research is a first step in understanding the relation between governance and 
funding on the one hand and the effect of budget pressure under austerity on the 
other. We explore the relation as posed in four hypotheses in the cases. The 
research aims to developing more specific pointers for a future (more quantitative) 
analysis of the relation between public transport governance and the way in which 
austerity measures work out. Such a research will need a first evaluation of possible 
relevant variables to analyze in the survey. It is this step that this article provides.  
3 Theoretical framework:  
multi-level governance and fiscal federalism 
In administrative science, a debate has been going on for decades on the best 
governmental level in which decision-making should be organized. In transport the 
theoretical debate was more focused, as the action space of many travellers is 
limited to metropolitan region, leading to the view that this metropolitan level is the 
right level to deal with the integrated decision-making on transport policies 
(Witbreuk, 2000). In addition, network design issues are most prominent on those 
locations where many different (levels of) networks meet, at key hubs in 
metropolitan areas (Nes, 2002). As a result, putting the decision-making on a 
metropolitan level seems to make sense in the world of public transport.  
Obviously, some networks are stretching beyond the metropolitan area. Networks of 
railway and also bus services can have national or even international characteristics. 
And in the field of public transport, these different levels of services combined 
improve their value through service coordination (e.g. time-tables, operating hours), 
system coordination (e.g. platform height, safety systems, loading and track gauge, 
catenary voltage), and market coordination (e.g. cabotage rights, market regulation) 
across these levels of service. Especially in railways, technical system coordination is 
essential, as the moving vehicle has many dependencies with the localized 
infrastructure.  
Consequently, there is value in coordinated decision-making on public transport on 
specific aspects on a national level or even a supra-national level. A sound example 
is the development of European Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) 
for the purpose of realizing technological system coordination across the national 
boundaries, including the development of ECTS as a uniform traffic control system.  
This all illustrates that decision-making on different aspects of public transport 
services makes more sense on different levels of government. A municipality 
deciding on track gauge is absurd, the European parliament deciding on a 
standardized timetable for services everywhere is as absurd.  
However, the detailed optimal answer on how to distribute decision-making over 
different levels of government is not as straightforward. An empirical illustration of 
the conundrum is the governance of the Paris public transport system. Over time the 
transport authority STIF has been a national authority and a cooperation between 
departments and municipalities (Kapteijn et al., 2012). Different governments had 
different views on the role of the national government in the governance of the 
public transport system of Île de France.   
Also elsewhere there is much discussion on transport jurisdictions being too 
fragmented, demanding for further integration achieving economies of scale 
(O’Sullivan and Patel, 2004; Witbreuk, 1997). On the other hand, the point is made 
that there is too much high level control, asking for decentralization on the basis of 
subsidiarity (see Bermann, 1994; Oates, 2005). In his work Chisholm (1989) shows 
that different levels of government with high fragmentation can organize transport 
quite well, even without a single authority coordinating. Tsebelis (Tsebelis, 2000) 
shows how a spread of (veto) power in a more fragmented governance can affect 
the ability of the governance system to realized major changes, like in our case 
substantial budget cuts. 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) give an excellent overview of the key dilemmas that exist 
in the cooperation of jurisdictions (cities, municipalities, provinces, departments, 
regions, states, countries, with an dedicated governance structure) on various levels 
and their role in the decision-making process. They show that there is no singular 
answer on whether jurisdictions should be designed around communities or should 
be designed around policy problems. Community based allows for coordination 
between problems (e.g. linking public transport policy to spatial policy), (problem 
and) task-oriented jurisdictions can deal focused with a specific problem, (e.g. 
German and Swiss Verkehrsverbünde).  
So, when we accept the fact that governance could influence the way in which 
austerity measures are taken, the way that jurisdictions and their responsibilities on 
public transport are set up can play an important role. Different problems (even in 
the field of public transport) can ask for different jurisdictions to deal with them. 
Optimizing a specific jurisdiction for each design problem (e.g. ticketing, pricing, 
routing, time-tabling, infrastructure standards, vehicle standards, etc.) leads to 
extreme fragmentation. The key answer to this dilemma is found in hybrid forms, 
like ad-hoc or problem-and-task-oriented jurisdictions of cooperating community-
based jurisdictions, like current in many metropolitan transport authorities.  
The governance issue becomes more complex when decision-making on various 
problems over different levels is separated from funding issues. In his work on fiscal 
federalism, Oates (2005, p.353) shows key mechanisms that hinder an efficient 
realization of public values (where he focuses on public “outputs”) when funding and 
decision-making are on different governmental levels. He cites De Tocqueville on the 
focus put on uniformity from the higher governance level, in a reality of variety in 
the lower levels. He also points at the incentives that exist for lower levels to 
overstate their needs, when funding is coming from a higher level. Veeneman (2002) 
recognized both in metropolitan public transport funding.  
Oates adds further mechanisms like the incentive to centralize (including funding) 
based on individual gains of those directly involved, rather than based on seeking the 
right level for problem solving and decision-making. Also, information asymmetries 
and strategic use of information make optimizing governance over different levels of 
government far more complex.   
In our article we want to consider whether the governance and funding structure in 
the cases have an influence on the way in which the pressure on funding is 
translated into the amount of money available for public transport, the supply of 
services and eventually patronage (see also Sørensen and Longva, 2011). We 
assume that the crisis has put pressure on public budgets, primarily on a national 
level. This assumption is coming from the fact that European budget rules demanded 
a maximum 3 percent of budget deficit on that level. With that in place, reducing 
income as a result of a poor economy will have a pressure on reducing expenditure, 
in a broad sense.  
Based on the theory discussed above, this paper formulates four hypotheses for the 
cases to explore. Our first hypothesis relates to autonomy over tax revenues in a 
layered governance model. The hypothesis is that  
A local tax base will reduce the effect of the budget pressure on the real 
expenditure on public transport, leading to limited effects on supply of 
services and patronage.  
This could be even stronger when an earmarked tax is in place. It could be weaker 
when local taxes are related to economic development, like property tax and 
employment related tax. The effect would be depending on the sensitivity of that tax 
to economic activity; a poor local and regional economy could also hurt the local 
economy, and consequently tax revenue. We will have a look at to what extent 
funding is generated regionally, either in the form of subsidies or in fare box 
revenues.  
A second hypothesis focuses on the effectiveness of decision-making in mono-lateral 
situations versus multi-lateral situations. The hypothesis is that  
Fragmentation in governance on a metropolitan level will limit the effect 
of budget pressure on subsidies on public transport.  
When no metropolitan jurisdiction exists, national budget pressure could trickle down 
slowly to all the different municipalities in a metropolitan area. When a metropolitan 
council exists, consisting of cooperating local jurisdictions, the decision-making can 
be slower, as interests between the local jurisdictions might conflict and negotiations 
will have to take place to come to decision-making on budgets. When a metropolitan 
or regional jurisdiction exists, the (supposed) national pressure could have direct 
effect and decision-making and could be swift. Obviously, it is also depending on the 
control the national government has on the funding of the jurisdictions in the region, 
as mentioned in the first hypothesis.  
A third hypothesis focuses on organizational boundaries between the political and 
administrative entities and the task organizations that carry out public transport 
related policies. The hypothesis is that  
In jurisdictions based on communities budget pressure is 
administratively easier to translate into reduction of the real 
expenditure, than in jurisdictions based on problem-and-task oriented 
organizations. 
Jurisdictions are generally community based: municipalities, provinces, departments, 
states, nations. When the jurisdiction on public transport is residing fully within such 
an entity, implementation of budget cuts can be straightforward. However, many 
metropolitan areas have problem-and-task-oriented jurisdictions for public transport. 
For example, municipalities have together set up a public transport authority. The 
jurisdiction of the authority is problem-and-task-oriented (only public transport) and 
spans various community-based jurisdictions (the municipalities). In such a case, an 
organizational barrier has to be taken between the decision-making entity (the 
municipalities) to the executing entity (the authority). That barrier can contain 
limitations for a swift reduction of the budget for public transport.     
A fourth hypothesis focuses on the contract between the authority and the operator. 
The hypothesis is that 
A regulatory regime with competitive tendering to private operators will 
dampen the effect of budget pressure as there are long-term 
concessions in place that limit the ability to reduce spending. The direct 
intervention in the budgets of publicly owned operators is expected to 
be more straightforward. The role of subsidies for free market operators 
is generally limited. 
Flexibility in long-term competitively tendered out contracts with private operators 
is expected to be limited. The private operator has built its business case on the 
expectation of a certain level of turnover during the term of the concession. In 
addition, we see that the procurement of busses often is aligned with the term of the 
concession, as might be contracts with staff. All this focuses changes around the 
transfer of the concessions. However, this limits flexibility mostly when set of 
contracts is limited. With many smaller competitively tendered out contracts (either 
shorter or less services), changes can still be more gradual. It is expected that long-
term direct-award contracts with public operators need and should contain more 
clauses for changing the service levels and related funding when needed, leading to 
more flexibility and easier reduction of funding, service levels and eventual probably 
patronage.  
On the basis of the information we have available in the cases, the next section will 
evaluate the relevant variables in the cases and look at the hypotheses.   
4 The empirical data from the cases:  
governance and funding of public transport  
4.1 Introduction 
First of all we have established a proxy for the budget pressure in the different 
cases.  
We looked at tax revenues as the main driver of budget pressure. As secondary 
indicators of how that pressure affected funding for public transport, we looked at 
the development of general expenditure and specific expenditure on transport 
(GF0405 according to the Classification of Functions of Government) of all levels of 
government from 2005 until 2013 in the databases of Eurostat. The result of that 
analysis shows that the first assumption, that the financial crisis has put strains on 
the budget of governments, needs substantial reconsidering, at least for transport 
related spending. 
   
  
 
Figure 1 Tax revenues in millions of Euros corrected for inflation to 2005 (OESD, 2014)  
Figure 1 shows tax revenues went down from 2008 in all five countries, most sharply 
in Italy and the United Kingdom (OECD, 2014). As revenue goes down, expectation 
is that the pressure on budget grows. We see an effect on the total expenditures, on 
all governmental levels we see the strongest decline in the United Kingdom and Italy 
and less so in Germany, France and the Netherlands from 2008 to 2012 (Eurostat, 
2014). Expenditure on transport follows the same pattern, with Italy having the 
strongest decline, far more than the United Kingdom. France and the Netherlands 
show a small decline in transport related expenditure since 2008 through 2012, with 
Germany picking up spending on transport already in 2012. Governments in our five 
countries are bringing in less money to spend. Budget pressure is there, but the 
direct effect on expenditure and transport related expenditure is less strong on the 
five countries. 
Consequently, if tax revenue is a suitable proxy for the budget pressure on the 
spending on regional public transport, all cases have experienced the pressure with 
the cases in Italy and the United Kingdom have experienced the strongest pressure. 
However, in spending already we see a dampening effect, which could be related to 
the position of the national government towards austerity measures. The strongest 
pressure was in 2008, 2009 and 2010. In our cases we want to see the development 
over time of three elements: funding for public transport, supply of public transport 
and use of public transport. Not all cases provide comparable information. However, 
we do not consider the data on those elements per se, however the development of 
funding, supply and use, given a expected budget pressure and a specific 
governance and funding system.  
4.2 Rhein-Main-Verkehrsverbund, Frankfurt, Germany 
Frankfurt is situated in the Bundesland (state) Hesse. The city itself has around 
250,000 inhabitants (Frankfurt am Main, 2014), the region around 6 million (Pütz, 
2012). The governance and funding is typical of the German Verkehrsverbund. 
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Multiple local jurisdictions are represented in the problem-and-task-oriented 
governance structure of the Rhein-Main-Verkehrsverbund (RMV). The Bundesland 
(state) Hesse, 11 cities, including Frankfurt and 15 regions participate in the RMV 
and are represented in its board (RMV, 2014a).  
Services are developed together with local and regional authorities. The RMV 
competitively tenders out the public transport operations. Contracts run around 7 
years and the region has around 40 concessions for bus transport and around 28 for 
rail transport. The jurisdictions in the RMV all have their own tax base and contribute 
to the RMV and directly to the public transport in their own jurisdiction.  
Public transport governance is not fragmented, with the existence of a single 
governing problem-and-task-oriented organization with representatives of all 
community-oriented jurisdictions. The RMV is the designated decision-making 
jurisdiction. Funding is coming from a local tax base, but taxes are not earmarked for 
public transport.   
Hypothesis Expected effect Explanation 
1 Low effect of 
budget pressure  
Local tax base reduces the budget pressure  
2 Medium effect of 
budget pressure  
The public authority is not concentrated and not 
fragmented over various organizations, however, 
multiple funding streams exist and different 
jurisdictions are involved in the governance of the 
authority.  
3 Low effect of 
budget pressure 
Problem-and-task-oriented organization in the RMV  
4 Medium effect of 
budget pressure  
Tendering of public transport operations leads to 
long-term contract that are not easily reduced. 
However, in this case many smaller concessions and 
contracts would provide more flexibility 
 Table 1 Governance and funding hypotheses in the Frankfurt case 
Table 1 shows that on all our hypotheses the Frankfurt case has the governance and 
funding characteristics to fend off budget pressure. Consequently, the expectation is 
that the effect of the budget pressure is limited. In addition, our proxy already 
showed that the budget pressure in Germany seems to be limited. So, in total we 
expect a limited effect of budget pressure in the Frankfurt case. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Subsidy7 455 441 451 463   465 467 
Bus kilometers n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.3 24.4 24.0 
Lines8 56 57 57 60 59 63 
Lines length8 511 521 528 531 529 567 
Traveller kilometers 160.1 184.7 194.5 196.5 198.7 196.8 
Traveller trips 48.3 49.7 52.5 53.2 53.6 53.3 
Farebox revenues  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 165 176 161 
Table 2 The effect variables in the Frankfurt case9 (sources: Hessen, 2014; RMV, 2014b) 
                                           
7 Data limited to the contribution of Bundesland Hessen 
8 Data limited to the city of Frankfurt 
9 For all tables: subsidies are in millions of euros corrected for inflation to 1-1-2005, line lengths are in kilometers, 
bus and traveller kilometers in millions per annum, traveller trips are per annum, and fare box revenues are in 
millions per annum corrected for inflation to 1-1-2005. All financial data is in money of the day. The colors 
distinguish between indicators of funding (white), supply (light grey) and use (dark gray) of public transport services. 
Table 2 indeed shows a limited effect: if budget pressure was apparent in this case, 
is did no trickle into public transport. Since 2008 the amount of funding that the 
state of Hessen has made available for public transport operation has been steadily 
rising. The supply of services is growing in the region, both in number of public 
transport lines and the length of the lines. In addition, patronage is also up, both in 
number of traveller kilometers as well as in the number of trips. The data shows that 
in the later years farebox revenues are varying without a clear trend. 
 
4.3 Syndicat Mixte des Transports du Rhône et 
l'agglomération Lyonnaise, Lyon, France 
Lyon is situated in the southeast of France and the capital of the Rhône department 
and the region Rhône-Alpes (Sytral, 2013). The city itself has around 500,000 
inhabitants, the region around 2.1 million. The governance and funding is 
concentrated in the Syndicat Mixte des Transports du Rhône et l'agglomération 
Lyonnaise  (SYTRAL). In total 65 municipal jurisdictions (all 59 municipalities in the 
Grande Lyon region and six municipalities outside Grande Lyon) are represented in 
the board of SYTRAL. SYTRALs main task is public transport provision, and as such 
represents a problem-and-task-oriented governance structure.  
Services are developed together with operator and local and regional authorities. 
SYTRAL competitively tenders out the public transport operations in one big 
concession (new contracts in 2005 and 2011), a key difference with the RMV. 
Currently, the operator is Keolis Lyon. The contract runs 6 years. The versement 
transport (a company tax, earmarked for public transport) contributes about 60 
percent of the total funding for subsidy. Revenue of that company tax has been 
growing almost 17 percent (from 230€ million in 2007 to 268€ million in 2013), well 
above the 7.6 percent inflation in that period. The remainder of the funding comes 
mostly from the municipalities and smaller other sources. These contributions have 
also been growing. Also, SYTRAL receives a limited state investment grant. 
In our perspective, relative to the other cases public transport governance is 
definitely not fragmented, with the set up of a single governing organization with a 
problem-and-task-oriented. Also here, governance over the different levels is 
simplified because of the board with representatives of all community-oriented 
jurisdictions. SYTRAL controls the full funding. As stated, funding is coming from a 
local tax base, a lot of which is earmarked for public transport; the versement 
transport. Despite possible economic problems and their effect on the companies 
contributing to the tax, the revenue of the tax has been growing. 
 
Hypothesis Expected effect Explanation 
1 Low effect of 
budget pressure  
Local tax base reduces the budget pressure  
2 High effect of 
budget pressure  
A single authority with a single integrated funding 
stream 
3 Low effect of 
budget pressure 
Problem-and-task-oriented organization in the 
SYTRAL 
4 Mixed effect of 
budget pressure  
Tendering of public transport operations leads to 
long-term contract that are not easily reduced. 
However, in this case one big contract was tendered 
twice, allowing for possible reductions. 
 Table 3 Governance and funding hypotheses in the Lyon case 
Table 3 shows that on the Lyon case has the governance and funding characteristics 
to fend off budget pressure, there is a local tax base and SYTRAL is a problem-and-
task oriented organization, limiting the possibilities for moving funding away from 
public transport by shifting between items in a single budget. Consequently, the 
expectation is that the effect of the budget pressure is limited. In addition, our proxy 
already showed that the budget pressure in France seems to be limited. So, in total 
we expect a limited effect of budget pressure in the Lyon case. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Subsidy 139    139    143 145    157    157    
Bus kilometers 49 49 47 49 53 56 
Lines length  1,249     1,255     1,232     1,290     1,351     2,947    
Traveller trips  366   388   395   378   400   423 
Farebox revenues 140 146    146   150    157   164    
Table 4 The effect variables in the Lyon case8 (Source: Sytral, 2013) 
Table 4 indeed shows that the subsidy has been growing over the entire period, with 
no effect of the assumed budget pressure. Since 2007, subsidies have been growing, 
with a large increase in 2011. The supply of services is growing in the region, in 
terms of the length of the lines. In addition, patronage is also up, both in in the 
number of trips and in fare box revenues.  
4.4 Province and Municipality of Milan, Milan, Italy 
Milan is situated in the northwest of Italy, in the Lombardy (Malpezzi, 2014). The 
municipality of Milan is the governmental body responsible for public transport in the 
Milan urban area. The municipality has around 1.3 million inhabitants. The 
municipality’s mobility agency (AMAT) has tendered out the service provision in the 
urban area to ATM S.p.A. and is retaining the revenues themselves. AMAT was set 
up in 2009.  
The province of Milan is responsible for public transport around the city, presumably 
bus transport. The province10 government tenders out its own services in six 
concessions to six different operators (Autoguidovie, Brianza, CAL, Movibus, NET, 
PMT). Train services are under the control of other regional and national 
governments. 
The national government funds most of the public transport subsidies, about 80 
percent. It provides a subsidy to the regions, which in turn provide subsidies to the 
municipalities. Both the national and regional government are pushing for a 
substantial reduction in budgets for public transport.  
 
Hypothesis Expected effect Explanation 
1 High effect of 
budget pressure  
Most of the funding for subsidies is coming from the 
national government  
2 Medium effect of 
budget pressure  
Two authorities in the area, with different roles. The 
need for shared decision-making is limited 
3 Medium effect of 
budget pressure 
AMAT is since 2009 the transport authority for the 
municipality, no transport authority for the province 
4 High effect of 
budget pressure  
Tendering of public transport operations leads to 
long-term contract that are not easily reduced.  
Table 5 governance and funding hypotheses in the Milan case 
                                           
10 The province recently changed to a metropolitan council. 
The table above shows that we expect a relatively high effect of budget pressure on 
public transport, when comparing Milan to the other cases. Especially, the fact that 
the national government is providing most of the funding for the subsidies in public 
transport is only also found in the Amsterdam case. Fragmentation is limited with 
two separate governmental layers (province and municipality), but both have distinct 
tasks with limited dependencies. Fragmentation is somewhat higher because of 
AMAT, the transport authority, put at arms length of the municipality.  
The municipality has been tendering of the services only since 2010. That means 
that the first tendering would have allowed for substantial budget cuts. However, 
after the first tendering, changes in budget under an existing contract will be less. As 
the pressure was highest in 2009, we expect a high effect of the budget pressure.  
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Subsidy11 280 275 290 304 280 273 
Vehicle kilometers n.a. n.a. n.a. 79 81 83 
Lines 127 127 103 103 116 123 
Lines length 1400 1441 1096 1096 1214 1226 
Traveller trips 653 696 702 702 699 698 
Farebox revenues 253 272 285 278 263 273 
Table 6 the effect variables in the Milan case (source: Malpezzi, 2014)  
Table 6 shows that the subsidies for public transport were growing until 2010, after 
which they were reduced again. The year 2009 saw a substantial reduction of the 
services, which was followed by a growth again in 2011. Since 2008, patronage is 
very stable and does not seem to be affected by these major changes in subsidies 
and service levels. The farebox revenues are slightly more volatile due to price 
changes. 
4.5 Stadsregio Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
Amsterdam is situated in the west of the Netherlands and the capital of the 
Netherlands. The city itself has about 700,000 inhabitants. The region has around 
1.5 million inhabitants (CBS, 2014). The governance and funding is concentrated in 
the Stadsregio Amsterdam (SRA). It is a cooperative entity between 16 municipal 
jurisdictions, which are represented in the board. SRA has a wider set of tasks 
beyond public transport, including infrastructure, spatial planning, youth and 
economic policy (SRA, 2014). It has a wider focus in terms of problem-and-task 
orientation, than SYTRAL and RMV.  
Services are developed together with operator. SRA competitively tenders out the 
public transport operations in three more peripheral concessions to private 
operators. The central concession is direct-awarded to the municipal transport 
operator of the city of Amsterdam GVB. This concession is important, it takes around 
80 percent of the total subsidy.  
Funding for public transport is almost entirely provided by the national government 
in a lump sum dotation for infrastructure and public transport operational subsidies: 
the Brede Doeluitkering (BDU). The development of the BDU (Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2014) showed how reduced tax revenue was translated to 
reduced funding for public transport in the Netherlands. In 2007 BDU funding for the 
whole country was 1,9€ billion growing to 2,0€ billion in 2010 staying at that level 
until 2013. From 2007 to 2013 inflation was around 13 percent. In addition, the 
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receivers of those funds also received substantially additional task to carry out with 
that funding. All in all, a clear budget cut, strongest since 2010.  
In our perspective, relative to the other cases, public transport governance is not 
fragmented, with the set up of a single governing problem-and-task-oriented 
organization with representatives of all municipal jurisdictions. Like SYTRAL, SRA 
controls the full funding stream. However, funding is coming from the national 
government. That is earmarked for a broader set of tasks. Over the last years, the 
national government has been reducing the funding on a national level and has been 
adding tasks. The budget pressure on the regional level is clear, even though our 
proxy for the Netherlands as a whole showed relatively low pressure.  
 
Hypothesis Expected effect Explanation 
1 High effect of 
budget pressure  
National tax base allows for national pressure on the 
regional budgets  
2 High effect of 
budget pressure  
A single authority with a broader perspective than 
public transport 
3 Medium effect of 
budget pressure 
SRA has a problem-and-task orientation, but at the 
same time SRA is responsible for wider set of tasks. 
This could limit the ability to fend off pressure to the 
public transport budget, because of pressure on 
other policy fields within SRA. 
4 Mixed effect of 
budget pressure  
The main contract is not competitively tendered, 
which should allow for flexibility in funding and 
services. However, three other concessions were 
competitively tendered to private operators for long 
periods (8 years) with possible extensions of 2 more 
years. This could hinder flexibility. 
 Table 7 Governance and funding hypotheses in the Amsterdam case 
Table 7 shows that SRA in the Amsterdam case has the governance and funding 
characteristics not as geared to fend off budget pressure as in the other cases. 
Consequently, the expectation is that the effect of the budget pressure is higher. In 
addition, our proxy already showed that the budget pressure in the Netherlands is 
higher and the real funding (from national to regional) has been under pressure. So, 
in total we expect a stronger effect of budget pressure in the Amsterdam case, than 
in the other cases. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Subsidy 294 303 314 328 307 327 
Vehicle hours12 1,618 1,636 1,662 1,699 1,706 1,620 
Vehicle kilometers12 35 36 37 38 37 35 
Traveller kilometers 138.6 135.7 139.7 155.1 164.4 168.7 
Traveller trips12 209 213 219 200 204 206 
Farebox revenues12 146 148 156 171 186 201 
Table 8 The effect variables in the Amsterdam case8 (sources: SRA, 2014; In ’t Veld and Schepers, 
2014; Bakker, Derriks and Savelberg, 2011; GVB, 2014) 
Table 6 shows the effect of the budget pressure in the Netherlands. The expectation 
from the hypotheses is a high effect, because of the single authority, the direct-
award of the main contract and the national funding. The effect is indeed visible in 
                                           
12 Data limited to the main concession in the region, held by the GVB 
2011. Subsidy is going down around 5 percent in that year. At the same time, supply 
stays at the same level and use is going up. We also see a growth in revenues, 
which could be the effect of higher prices or reduced fare dodging. In that period a 
contactless ticketing system was introduced, with a new pricing structure and gating 
off of the metro. It is likely that this has triggered both effects.   
 
4.6 Transport for Greater Manchester, Manchester, United 
Kingdom 
Manchester is situated in the northwest of England, in the United Kingdom. The city 
has around 500.000 inhabitants. The region has a total of 2,685 million inhabitants 
(TfGM, 2014a). Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) is coordinating the public 
transport system in the region, next to a wider set of transport related tasks. TfGM 
has a governing board in the form of the Transport for Greater Management 
Committee, with 33 representatives from the 10 boroughs (districts) of the greater 
Manchester area.  
The TfGM competitively tenders out a limited part of the bus services in the area.  
Most bus services, though, are developed and operated by private operators, the big 
three being Arriva, Stagecoach and First. The French public transport company RATP 
holds a ten-year concession operating and maintain the tram in the city, Metrolink. 
TfGM owns the system.  
While in our other cases the transport authority initiates the delivery of the bus 
services (see Van de Velde, 1999) either through direct-award or competitively 
tendering services, TfGM can add services, after market initiative has taken its 
course. TfGM can fill possible gaps the private operators leave and spend 31£ million 
(or 39€ million) in 2011 on that task by tendering out bus services. It also provides 
concessionary fares (reduced fares for vulnerable groups), which took up around 66£ 
million (or 83€ million) in that year. Also, it provides traveler information and 
investment support for infrastructure and accessible transport.  
TfGM receives its funding from the ten councils of the boroughs in the Greater 
Manchester area through a levy (totaling around 190£ or 230€ in 2011). The levy is 
general and not earmarked for public transport. In addition, the national Department 
of Transport is proving a rail grant to the region that is earmarked for tendering out 
of services on the Northern Rail (82£ million or 103€ in 2011). It was part of national 
budget cuts. 
In our perspective, relative to the other cases public transport governance is not 
fragmented, with the set up of a single governing organization with a problem-and-
task-orientation on transport policy issues in the whole Greater Manchester area.  
 
Hypothesis Expected effect Explanation 
1 Low effect of 
budget pressure  
Local tax base reduces the budget pressure  
2 High effect of 
budget pressure  
A single authority with a single integrated funding 
stream 
3 Low effect of 
budget pressure 
TfGM has a problem-and-task-oriented organization, 
slightly broader than public transport. 
4 Low effect of 
budget pressure  
The largely open market means that reduction of 
government expenditure could have a limited effect 
on overall supply. The tram is tendered out in a 10-
year concession, also limiting the effect of pressure. 
It is running without subsidy. Part of the bus services 
is tendered, but that is a limited percentage of the 
market. 
 Table 9 Governance and funding hypotheses in the Manchester case 
Our proxy showed earlier that the budget pressure on transport in general was 
relatively high in the United Kingdom; government expenditure on transport went 
down substantially since 2008. Table 9 shows the expectation of a relatively low 
effect of the budget pressure. TfGM is an organization with a specific problem-and-
task orientation. This could hinder shifting money around between departments and 
as such limit the possibilities. In addition, the local tax base could limit the effect of 
the budget pressure from the national government, as local money streams counter 
it.  Moreover, the concession for the tram, under government initiative, is running 
without subsidy. This means that even with reduced government spending, supply 
could stay at the same level, reducing the effect of budget pressure. Finally, even if 
government spends less money, the largely open market reduces the dependency of 
supply on government funding.  
 
Year 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Subsidy  135 134 121   110 105 113 
Lines13 3 3 3 3 4 6 
Lines length 464 457 458 461 460 483 
Traveller kilometers13 210.0 220.7 206.1 200.8 228.4 261.7 
Traveller trips 266.9 268.6 275.8 269.3 265.4 265.5 
Farebox revenues13 37 33 28 25 28 35 
Table 10 The effect variables in the Manchester case8 (TfGM, 2014b; DoT, 2014) 
Table 10 suggests that budget pressure indeed lead to reduced funding for public 
transport by 2010. However, this is the effect of the currency conversion to euros. 
Only after 2012 we see a significant reduction in £ because of the fact that the rail 
grant from the national government went down by 35 percent. On a regional level 
though, funding stays at the same level. For the farebox revenue, the table suggests 
a dip in 2009 and 2010. As this is also a currency effect, the real trend in pounds 
was growth since 2009.  
As funding grows also supply of services grows. For all types of public transport the 
line length shows a limited growth. And for the tram the number of lines grows. The 
use of public transport shows a reduction in trips from 2009, but a growth of the 
kilometers travelled on the tram since 2012. Farebox revenues go up after dipping in 
2009. 
5 Analysis of the cases 
A first major conclusion has to be that the cases show a limited effect of budget 
pressure on public transport, basically in all cases. First of all, transport expenditure 
on a national level stayed at a similar level in three of the five countries. Only in the 
                                           
13 Data limited to the Manchester tram system.  
United Kingdom and Italy, spending on transport in general went down substantially. 
In Manchester we can see this in the reduction of the railway grant.  
The case in which the pressure seems to be most directly translated into reduced 
funding is in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam case and in Italy, the Milan case. The 
specific aspect in these cases is that the regions have no local tax base used for 
public transport, different from the other cases. The national funding for public 
transport went down substantially, leading to a dip in government subsidy to public 
transport in both regions. Growing fare box revenues from passengers have 
counterbalanced this somewhat in Amsterdam, but not in Milan. In Amsterdam, the 
growing revenue was the effect of further distance traveled and a new ticketing 
system, reducing fare dodging. In 2012, however, the funding was back on its 
original growing trend line. In both Amsterdam and Milan, the effect on patronage 
was limited. In Lyon, France, the versement transport seems to limit the potential 
effect of budget pressure. Here, subsidy kept growing substantially over the years 
following the financial crisis of 2008.  
Consequently, the effect on supply of services is mostly seen in the Milan case. Only 
after tendering supply levels went up again. In all different indices in all other cases, 
supply of services is essentially growing. The cases only show single years with a 
slight dip. Amsterdam 2012 can be seen as an exception with a substantial reduction 
of the vehicle hours in 2012.  
 
In terms of use of public transport, the indicators show growth for Frankfurt and 
Lyon and little changes in Milan. In Manchester we see a reduction in trips since 
2008, even though supply was not affected. This could be the effect of the crisis on 
the autonomous demand of public transport services. And in Amsterdam, with the 
direct effect of budget pressure, use is growing on traveller kilometers, despite a 
reduction in trips.  
 
The cases provide a first illustration on how aspects of the governance structures in 
the regions can have an effect on the way in which austerity measures are taking 
form. Fragmentation seems to play a major role: the more separate the organization 
with a focus on public transport functions, the less straightforward it is to strongly 
reduce the funding as it is harder to shift money between budget elements. 
Fragmentation in decision-making can also come through local funding, where 
different jurisdictions all are contributing, like in Manchester. Decision-making on 
austerity measures can be slowed down on issues which jurisdiction will reap the 
benefit (by paying less or better services) and who will carry the burden (by paying 
more of having less services). The cases of Amsterdam and Milan showed how a 
singular money stream from higher levels of government seems to support a swift 
reduction in subsidies. This is also supported by the reduction of the UK railway 
grant to Manchester. 
 
In terms of the governance structure between the authority and the operator, the 
cases show a wide variety. We have a free market (Manchester), direct-award 
(Amsterdam), competitive tendering in one big concession (Lyon), competitive 
tendering of separate urban and regional services (Milan), and competitive tendering 
in smaller concessions (Frankfurt). In our hypothesis this could provide the most 
barriers in the Lyon case, with the long-term contract blocking change. The least 
barriers to reduce funding would exist in the Amsterdam case, with a flexible 
contract and direct control over the municipal operator. In general, this is in line with 
our observations.  
When we combine the different hypotheses, on the one hand of the spectrum we 
see governance with many cooperating municipalities with their own tax base and a 
shared transport authority being less sensitive to the financial crisis then a regional 
government with a transport department being funded by national means. 
The cases show little variety in terms of the community-oriented or problem-and-
task-oriented jurisdictions. All cases show problem-and-task-oriented jurisdictions, 
with slight distinctions. RMV has a pure public transport orientation, SYTRAL and 
TfGM slightly broader and the SRA much broader. The latter seems to further 
support the easier reduction of funding.  
Obviously, the cases do not provide enough data to decisively conclude the validity 
of our hypotheses. For example, what exact austerity measures were taken, has not 
been part of our analysis. Also, it would be valuable to see how effective actual fiscal 
stability measures can be. We see this article as a first inductive step. That said, the 
first and second hypothesis currently have the strongest explanatory power for the 
developments we see in the cases in terms of the response to budget pressure. A 
local and earmarked tax base and fragmented governance make the public transport 
budget less vulnerable. The availability of a substantial stream of local funding 
makes public transport less dependent on shifts in priorities in national funding 
streams. This is not a weakness of governance, just a different balance in national 
and local priorities reflected through their own funding stream. The fragmented 
governance could be seen as a weakness of governance, where multiple actors are 
less able to swiftly decide on (possibly needed) budget cuts for public transport than 
a single actor deciding on the funding. 
The governance structure between authority and operator seems to have less of an 
influence. Operators that are government owned with direct-award contract proof to 
be less flexible than expected. Competitively tendered contracts provide a good basis 
for flexibility, as long as the concessions are not too big and the contract periods not 
to long. A free market situation is very flexible, but hardly depending on the 
government funding of public transport services. 
6 Conclusions 
Funding for public transport grows and diminishes. Obviously, part of that funding is 
dependent on the farebox revenue: when more people choose to travel, revenues 
grow. This is a very flexible coupling between the services provided and the 
revenues coming in. However, most public transport systems are substantially 
subsidized. Governments are deciding whether or not to spend public money on 
providing a public transport service.  
That decision-making process is less straightforward than one might think. Public 
administration literature has shown many of the mechanisms that influence the way 
in which decisions on funding are made. They point at fragmentation in different 
levels of government and the way in which cooperation between these levels and 
between jurisdictions on a certain level are organized as key factors.  
In this paper we looked at how these factors influenced the funding of public 
transport, in those moments that budget pressure is rising. In 2008 the financial 
crisis put pressure on the budgets of many European governments, which was 
expected to have also put pressure on the funding of public transport. 
In the cities in our study, we see only a limited effect of that budget pressure. 
Subsidies of public transport were not diminished substantially across the board and 
were often growing. The case that showed the most effect, Amsterdam, lacked 
characteristics that (from the theory) would allow for fending off that budget 
pressure: no (earmarked) local tax base, an relatively integrated organization on a 
metropolitan level governing on various policy areas, a direct-award contract to a 
publicly owned operator.  
In our analysis we assert that the national funding of the Amsterdam region was the 
multi-level governance issue that played the most important role. It seems to be the 
key factor in the reduced funding for Amsterdam public transport. 
Multi-level governance, and the horizontal and vertical fragmentation that it comes 
with, reduces flexibility. Negotiations on who will reap the benefits and who will carry 
the burden of a specific option under review take time in a decision-making process. 
That is not necessarily a negative thing. Public transport has the strongest position 
when it is developed in line with lengthy processes of spatial development. People 
choose for public transport as part of their broader decision in life: where to live and 
work (Currie and Rose, 2008). Stability of services in that context is of value and 
helps public transport being successful over the long run. Obviously, that argument 
is limited, as in the long-term reduction in demand should lead to reduction in 
supply.  
Further research is needed to develop the understanding of governance in 
metropolitan public transport to understand how decision-making context influences 
the success of the public transport services it produces. This could start with 
extending the set of cases and including an analysis of the actual aursterity measure 
taken. This paper has shown that the variability in the included variables is high for 
the set of cases presented here. Adding cases could further develop the 
understanding of how governance influences funding decisions public transport. Key 
issue would be how multi-level governance would allow for an effective decision-
making and funding of public transport. As the cases have shown, multi-level 
governance is the reality of metropolitan public transport. 
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